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Products Liability in the Small Capital Goods
Manufacturing Firm: Problems, Proposals and
Pitfalls
Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1976:
Not much remains of Havir Manufacturing Co. of St. Paul,
Minn. The small punch-press maker has halted production, auc-
tioned off much of its machinery and idled most of its 80 em-
ployees....
.. . [T]he company was hit by a wave of lawsuits filed by
press operators around the country who had lost fingers or hands
in Havir presses.[' ] ...
Havir's product liability insurance premiums soared from
$2,000 in 1970 to $4,000 in 1974 and $10,000 in 1975. Last
September [1975], the company's insurer canceled Havir's pol-
icy. Replacement insurance would have cost $200,000, or 10% of
the company's $2 million in annual sales....
Havir's case is extreme, of course, but far from unique.
Thousands of American manufacturers, large and small, are
finding that the cost of insurance covering the products they sell
is significantly hurting their business.... Among the hardest-hit
industries are drugs, general aircraft, tools and various kinds of
capital equipment.2
Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1985:
Acmat Corp. had a good safety record and a booming busi-
ness removing cancer-causing asbestos from schools, hospitals
and homes. Then last spring disaster hit ... : [Its insurer] can-
celed all policies connected with asbestos, including Acmat's.
After a search of 30 other insurers, the company [found cover-
age at] an astonishing $4 million in annual premiums.
Acmat grabbed it, even though premiums were twice what it
paid last year for coverage that was 10 times as great. It at least
keeps the company in business.3
When products liability insurance becomes unavailable or unaf-
fordable, a small capital goods manufacturing firm may be faced
with bankruptcy or liquidation if an accident occurs and a large
personal injury judgment is awarded. Consequently, the injured
I. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972);
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
2. Wysocki, Litigation Load: Manufacturers Are Hit with More Lawsuits, Rising
Insurance Costs, Wall St. J., June 3, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (emphasis added).
3. Day, Insurance for Liability Skyrockets, L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1985, Part I, at
1, col. 1.
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plaintiff may have to look to the perhaps inadequate assets of the
firm for compensation. The insurance industry blames strict prod-
ucts liability law, increased litigiousness of the public and in-
creased levels of personal injury awards for the increasing cost
and scarcity of products liability insurance.' Others blame the in-
surance industry.5 Still others blame the tort litigation system, the
legal profession, unsafe manufacturing practices, inflation, in-
creased consumer and worker awareness of products liability, the
complexity of products and product misuse.'
This Comment examines strict products liability from the per-
spective of the small capital goods manufacturing firm. First, a
brief introduction to the basic doctrine of strict products liability,
its genesis, goals, rationales and trends is included." Second, the
problems of the small capital goods manufacturing firm are delin-
eated and the goals and rationales of strict products liability as
applied to such a firm are explained. 9 Third is a discussion of pro-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 28, col. I (quoting Ralph Nader, consumer activist; James P. Corcoran,
New York's Superintendent of Insurance; and Bruce Bunner, California Insurance
Commissioner).
6. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability Final Report, Nov. 1, 1977, at 1-20-
31 [hereinafter Task Force Report]. The Task Force, which acted under the direction of
the United States Department of Commerce, also noted that there are other causes of the
products liability problem including "inflation and the increase in number and complexity
of products." Id. at 1-21.
The Task Force's reports are available from the National Information Service, Spring-
field, Virginia 22161 (Attention: Sales Desk). Reference should be made to the appropriate
accession number and a check made payable to NTIS in the proper amount should be
enclosed:
Final Report-PB 273-220, $20.00 (1 vol.) (1977) [hereinafter Task Force Final Report].
Selected Papers-PB 278-625, $17.50 (I vol.) (1978) [hereinafter Task Force Selected
Papers].
Legal Study-PB 263-601, $31.25 (7 vol.) (1977) (The Research Group, Inc.) [hereinafter
Task Force Legal Study].
Legal Study: Executive Summary-PB 265-450, $6.00 (first of 7 vol.) (1977).
Industry Study-PB 265-542, $21.25 (2 vol.) (1977) (Gordon Associates, Inc.) [hereinaf-
ter Task Force Industry Study].
Insurance Study-PB 263-600, $9.00 (1 vol.) (1977) (McKinsey, Inc.) [hereinafter Task
Force Insurance Study].
7. The Task Force defined a small firm as one with less than $2,500,000 in sales.
Task Force Industry Study, supra note 6, vol. 1, at IV-4. S. 100, 99th Cong., ist. Sess.
(1985), defines "capital good" as
any product, other than a motor vehicle, or a vessel, aircraft, or railroad used
primarily to transport passengers, or any component of any such product, if it is
also of a character subject to allowance for depreciation under the Internal Reve-
nue code of 1954, as amended, and was-
(A) used in a trade business;
(B) held for the production of income; or
(C) sold, leased, or donated to a governmental or private entity for the production
of goods, for training, for demonstration, or other similar purposes.
8. See infra notes 12-44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 45-113 and accompanying text.
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posed legislative actions to address the problems caused by the
strict products liability doctrine and the laws' possible effect on
the small capital goods manufacturer. 10 Finally, the pitfalls of the
current legislative attempts at correcting the problems are ex-
amined and suggestions for a possible solution are offered.1"
INTRODUCTION
The first year law student marks them well-the signposts
along the road toward strict products liability. The evolution,
some say revolution, 2 began with the concepts of caveat emptor
and privity of contract in Winterbottom v. Wright.13 The move-
ment continued through the fall of privity in negligence cases, as
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,14 and the imposition of im-
plied warranty without fault in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.15 The stage was thus set for the strict liability theory es-
poused by Justice Traynor 6 to become the law in California.17
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Justice Traynor
wrote: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion for defects, proves to have a defect that injures a human be-
ing."'aWith the support of Dean Prosser as Reporter for the Re-
statement of Torts and the Greenman decision, the rule of strict
products liability as embodied in section 402A19 of the Restate-
10. See infra notes 115-90 and accompanying text.
1I. See infra notes 191-234 and accompanying text.
12. Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP.
U.L. REv. 335, 343 (1984).
13. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16, This theory first appeared in 1944 in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944).
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
18. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT §
402A].
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
[Vol. 23
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ment quickly swept the country.20 Despite little legislative action,
but with overwhelming judicial support, 2' the doctrine of strict
products liability took on enormous importance to sellers of
products.
The trend has been toward the elimination or severe curtail-
ment of the traditional defenses to an action in strict products lia-
bility such as privity of contract, intervening cause, modification
of the product by others, contributory negligence and due care by
the manufacturer.22 Privity of contract is never a defense to strict
products liability23 and the exercise by the manufacturer of "all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product" is irrele-
vant under section 402A.24 Since strict liability is imposed on the
seller without fault or negligence, the user's contributory negli-
gence is not a complete bar to recovery in most jurisdictions.25
However, a growing number of states apply comparative fault
principles to proportionally reduce the plaintiff's recovery because
of his negligence despite doctrinal problems of mixing strict liabil-
ity and negligence.26
Most states, under section 402A, require that a plaintiff prove
that (1) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; (2) such
defect existed when the product left the seller's control; and (3)
the defect was the proximate cause of the injury. But two states,
California and Alaska, merely require that the plaintiff prove that
the design of the product caused the injury; the difficult burden of
proof then shifts to the defendant manufacturer or seller to show
contractual relation with the seller.
20. Wade, supra note 12, at 343. Dean Prosser described the strict liability move-
ment as "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1966) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel]. Just six years after the Henningsen decision, twenty-three states
and the District of Columbia had adopted strict liability either judicially or by statute. Id.
at 794. For a detailed treatment of the history and development of strict tort liability, see
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel], and Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
21. Wade, supra note 12, at 343.
22. Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability
Crisis, 14 FORUM 251, 256-57 (1978).
23. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. Dworkin, Product Liability Reform and the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 50, 63 (1981); RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978).
27. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra, note 19. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 329, 188 N.W. 2d 426, 432 (1971).
1987]
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by a risk-benefit analysis that the design was not defective."
Some jurisdictions impute to the manufacturer knowledge of
technology that is available at time of trial rather than at time of
manufacture. 29 In New Jersey, a defendant asbestos manufacturer
was held strictly liable for failure to warn of the dangers of asbes-.
tos even though the danger may not have been knowable at the
time that the asbestos was processed.30
A few courts have come very close to absolute liability by
"holding that the tort-litigation system should provide a recovery
for persons who prove they were injured by a product. '31 Addi-.
tionally, the liability of the defendant manufacturer is increased
by the well-known propensity for juries to compensate the severely
injured plaintiff knowing tacitly that the defendant is insured or
"can afford it." 32
The small capital goods manufacturer, however, cannot always
"afford it" nor is it always insured. One survey indicated that
twenty-nine percent of small manufacturing firms carry no prod..
ucts liability insurance.3 3 Whether the small manufacturer can
"afford it" depends on its competitive position in its industry, its
financial condition and the size of the judgment.3 4 The goals and
rationales of strict products liability are commendable:
(1) to provide compensation to persons injured by defective
products;3 5
28. "[A] product may ... be found defective ... if the plaintiff demonstrates that
the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish...
that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent
in such design." Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443,
456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978). See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871, 884 (Alaska 1979).
29. Birnbaum, supra note 22, at 256-57. See also Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App.
375, 385, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (1976) (adequacy of drug manufacturer's warning deter-
mined from dangers of product as subsequently manifested rather than at time of manufac-
ture or sale).
30. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
31. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 1-27. See also Report of the Tort Policy
Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in
Insurance Availability and Affordability 61 (Feb. 1986) (available from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 20402) [hereinaf-
ter Working Group Report].
32. Task Force Legal Study, supra note 6, vol. III, at 121 (citing Prosser, The As-
sault upon The Citadel, supra note 20, at 1115, and Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,
supra note 20, at 842).
33. Task Force Industry Study, supra note 6, vol. I, at IV-9. See Working Group
Report, supra note 31, at 6-15, for a discussion of increases in the costs of various types of
insurance coverages.
34. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 20, at 1121-22 & n.147
(quoting Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Prod-
ucts-An Opposing View, 24 TENN L. REV. 938, 947 (1957)).
35. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 23
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(2) to shift the loss for defective products as an incentive for man-
ufacturers and sellers to produce safer products by placing the
cost of defective products on those who can most effectively re-
duce the hazards of these products;38
(3) to spread the risk of the injury through insurance or the broad
customer base of the manufacturer or seller;37
(4) to internalize the risk of defective products so that they will
fully "pay their way" in the marketplace;38 and
(5) to reduce the injured person's difficult burden of proving the
negligence of the manufacturer or seller.39
These goals and rationales are acceptable, even desirable, in the
case of truly defective products, and especially in the case of man-
ufacturing defects.40 However, these rationales weaken when ap-
plied to design defects 41 warning defects42 and unsafe use or una-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. The costs of products should not
be externalized (that is, spread to other products) because defective products would then be
"subsidized" by not being priced at their full cost to society. These defective products thus
would not fully "pay their own way" in the marketplace. Montgomery & Owen, Reflec-
tions on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C.L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976).
39. Id. at 809.
40. Manufacturing defects occur when a product fails to meet the manufacturer's
own specifications. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY 269 (1980). Generally, these are due to physical flaws in materials or components
or faulty assembly into the final product.
41. Defective design is most troublesome. How can the court or a jury in a relatively
short time be expected to evaluate all the considerations that took technical design engi-
neers years of study? Furthermore, there are always trade-offs and balancing required in
design engineering (for example, cost or weight v. utility and reasonable safety). The court
or jury is evaluating the design based on a specific accident that has occurred rather than
the probability of accidents that may occur. For example, a gas tank placed in the front of
the vehicle will reduce dangers in rear-end collisions but will increase danger in head-on
collisions. A court or a jury in a rear-end collision case may determine that the vehicle is
defective because the tank is placed in the rear; but another court or jury in a head-on
collision could determine that it was defective because it was placed in front. For a court
troubled by this difficult problem, see Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). Examples of design defects are (1) the lack
of some safety device (for example, a guard, an electrical safety switch, a mechanical cut-
off device or a "safety" on a gun), (2) flammable fabrics used in clothes, (3) chemicals (for
example, drain cleaners, household cleaners and products) and (4) products made of un-
suitable materials (for example, too soft or hard or brittle for their intended use). W. KEE-
TON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 40, at 364-65.
42. Warning defects present other problems. When is a warning required? How spe-
cific must it be? Must it delineate every possibility? Must a warning be given if the danger
is obvious (for example, a permanent warning that a knife may cut)? Under a traditional
risk-benefit analysis, a warning would almost always be required because the low cost of
warning (a few words printed on the product) would be outweighed by the cost of the
accident. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495,
514-16 (1976). This is especially true when determined by a jury with an injured plaintiff
present. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 32 n.25.
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voidable accidents because these concepts are extremely difficult
to define. When strict products liability has been applied to these
latter problems, the doctrine has been extensively abused and
"often has had the effect of transforming [strict liability] in prac-
tice into absolute liability. '43 These latter problems plague the
small capital goods manufacturer in particular; therefore, the
goals and rationales of strict products liability tend to break down
when applied to such a manufacturer.44
I. PROBLEMS OF THE SMALL CAPITAL GOODS MANUFACTURING
FIRM
In the rush toward strict products liability and the accomplish-
ment of its goals, some problems have developed, especially for the
small manufacturer of capital goods. The Task Force Report 45
states:
For small firms that manufacture nothing but long-life prod-
ucts such as industrial machinery, the problem [of unavailability
or unaffordability of insurance] is especially acute. Many of
these firms have [liability] exposures that may amount to 10 to
20 times the current year's production-i.e., machines now in
use that were sold over many years' time. Thus, in developing
[an insurance rate] to be applied to the current year's sales, the
insurer must multiply the loss potential per machine 10 to 20
times.46
Former Senator James Pearson (R-Kansas) began one of the
earliest attempts to solve this problem. He introduced federal leg-
islatio 47 in 1977 after receiving some three hundred letters from
small manufacturers having trouble obtaining products liability
insurance.' 8 The following is a typical case from Missouri:
"In... 1976 ... and for five years prior to that we carried ... a
rate... of approximately $3,000 for our product liability cover-
age. [Our insurance company] notified us of cancellation of that
product liability coverage, and we attempted to seek a carrier...
43. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 61.
44. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 20, at 1 121-22 n.147.
45. Due to the potential problems of strict products liability and its possible effect cn
the manufacturing capability of the United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce
sponsored an exhaustive study of the products liability area. The Final Report of this Fed-
eral Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, though published on November 1, 1977,
remains as a landmark analysis of products liability. This report, including the supporting
Legal Study, Industry Study and Insurance Study, has been the source of almost all of the
proposed products liability legislation, both federal and state.
46. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at ES-5.
47. S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Parallel legislation was introduced in the
House of Representatives. H.R. 6300, 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977).
48. Smith, Uniform Product Liability Law, but on Whose Terms?, 5 CAL. LAw. 34,
36 (Jan. 1985).
[Vol. 23
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. We could not find a standard carrier that would even quote us
and had to go to what I believe they call the excess market.[ 49 ].
• . We finally received about six or seven quotes from this mar-
ketplace and accepted the lowest quote, which was . . .
$39,000. ' '5°
No doubt there are instances where the large recoveries based
on the theory of strict products liability in general or the unavaila-
bility or unaffordability of insurance in particular has forced a
small manufacturing firm into bankruptcy or liquidation. 1 But
specific information and data are lacking because there are many
reasons for the failure of small firms including mismanagement,
insufficient capital, loss of market and costs exceeding receipts.52
To illustrate the problems encountered by the small capital goods
manufacturer, a hypothetical situation based on actual experience
will be examined.5 3
A small manufacturer of farm equipment has been in business
for over twenty-five years producing a cotton harvesting machine
needed by farmers as evidenced by average sales of $1 million per
year and pretax profits of $75,000.00. Prior to 1982, there had
been no products liability claims filed against the firm.
In 1982, a personal injury action of arguable merit was filed.
One of the safety features of the machine was that it was ground
driven, that is, when the machine stopped, all rotation of the
equipment stopped. Therefore, when the operator stopped and got
off the machine, there was no danger of being caught in any rotat-
ing equipment. Furthermore, there were numerous warnings, both
in the operator's manual and on the machine, to stay clear of the
machine and any moving parts and to avoid riding on the ma-
chine. The machine was normally not run at night and no lights
were furnished by the manufacturer, but some operators "rigged"
lights to extend operating time.
One night while driving the machine, the operator heard an un-
usual noise. The operator climbed off the machine and had an-
other person drive while the operator listened for the noise. The
operator then climbed under a safety bar and reached his right
hand across a three foot safety space and was injured. The opera-
tor alleged a design defect and an inadequacy of warnings in strict
49. The excess market refers to insurance firms that will insure risks that are refused
by standard carriers but normally only at much higher premiums.
50. Task Force Report Selected Papers, supra note 6, at 554 (quoting Howard
Bobroff, owner of Lawnmower Parts Manufacturing Co., Aug. 11, 1977, Kansas City,
Mo.).
51. See, e.g., the case of Havir Manufacturing Co. Wysocki, supra note 2.
52. Task Force Report, supra note 6, at VI-34.
53. The author personally experienced the events described in the ensuing text.
1987]
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
products liability.54
In 1983, an unrelated action of equally questionable merit was
filed. There, the operator raised the basket of the machine into a
high voltage power line and was killed despite the warnings on the
machine and warnings made by his employer to watch overhead
clearance. The operator's parents alleged a design defect and an
inadequacy of warning in a wrongful death action in strict prod-
ucts liability.?5
Both claims were the result of on the job accidents to other
firms' employees using the small manufacturer's product. Further,
both employees were covered by workers' compensation. In
twenty-five years, the firm has sold over four thousand machines
and most of them are still operating.
Based on these two lawsuits, and without regard to their valid-
ity, the firm's products liability insurance premiums increased
from $4,000 per year for $10.5 million in coverage to over
$40,000 per year for $2.5 million in coverage. In addition, very
few insurance companies were willing to even quote on the cover-
age. " The old line insurance company that had insured the com-
pany for six years now declined to renew the policy, thereby forc-
ing the manufacturer to obtain insurance from second or third
rate firms. Moreover, there was the very real possibility in the fu-
ture of further reduction in coverage limits or unavailability of
liability insurance at any price since only three insurance compa-
nies would even submit a quotation on the coverage. On the facts
of this hypothetical paradigm, the goals and rationales of strict
products liability are reexamined.
A. Compensation to Plaintiff
On its surface, the goal of compensating an injured plaintiff'
seems a worthy one. Severely injured persons are generally unpre-
pared for such consequences and loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to them. 7
Some commentators, however, question whether compensation
to the plaintiff should be a legitimate goal of products liability
54. The claim was settled by the insurance company for $100,000.00.
55. The claim was settled by the insurance company for $35,000.00
56. When a lawsuit is filed against a firm, details of the lawsuit along with other
underwriting information (sales, number of employees, type of products, etc.) is given to all
prospective insurers before they will agree to furnish a price quotation on the desired
coverage.
57. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 23
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law. 8 The goal of compensation to the plaintiff is based essen-
tially on compassion, but allocating scarce resources based on
compassion may be a serious error.59 Perhaps, considering the eco-
nomic realities of the 1980's, "what is really needed in times of
increasing scarcity are principles that give stimulus rather than
disincentive to those who are in a position to make new discoveries
and to increase productivity." 60
The goal of compensation to a plaintiff from the manufacturer
without its fault or wrongdoing is contrary to the very concept of
the tort as the civil wrong.6' The plaintiff should not have an al-
most automatic right to compensation; rather, the defendant
should be liable in tort only on a clear showing that the manufac-
turer has done something wrong, that is, has breached a duty of
care or has been negligent.62 Compensation to the injured plaintiff
under the strict liability theory of many jurisdictions has become
merely a "deep pocket" rationale. There is no inherent justice in
compensating the injured plaintiff at the expense of the manufac-
turer without a showing of fault or negligence.63
Even assuming that compensation to an injured plaintiff is a
legitimate goal of society. This goal is, however, frustrated in the
paradigm when either the unavailability or unaffordability of in-
surance forces the manufacturer to go without insurance." The
injured plaintiff is thus forced to rely on the perhaps inadequate
assets of the firm for compensation. Therefore, in order to accom-
plish this goal of strict products liability, insurance at affordable
rates should be made available to all reasonably insurable product
manufacturers.6 5
B. Incentive For Safer Products
Certainly, a goal of producing safer products is laudable. But
there is some question whether a strict liability standard has ac-
complished or will accomplish that goal more effectively than a
negligence standard.66 Further, there is considerable question
58. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681, 703-07 (1980); Epstein, Products Liability: The Gathering Storm, 1 REG. AEI J. ON
Gov. & Soc. 15, 20 (Sept./Oct. 1977).
59. Owen, supra note 58, at 705.
60. Id.
61. Epstein, supra note 58, at 16.
62. Id.; Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 61.
63. Plant, supra note 34, at 946. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 61-62.
64. Coccia, Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A Proposed Federal Solution,
1983 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 236, 262.
65. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at V-2.
66. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (1973).
1987]
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
about the resulting safety of products under the rule of strict lia-
bility versus that of negligence.67 Under strict liability, the manu-
facturer has an incentive to produce safer products to avoid liabil-
ity since it must pay for all accident costs caused by its product.68
Similarly, under the negligence rule, since the cost of unavoidable
accidents is borne by the injured persons, consumers will tend to
purchase safer products thus increasing the manufacturer's incen-
tive to build safer products through the market mechanism.69
Which theory results in safer products is far from certain.70 Some
commentators contend that because, in most cases, insurance is
available at a reasonable price, it is considered merely a cost of
doing business and has little effect on the safety of the product. 1
When a product, especially a capital goods product, has been
made as safe as reasonably possible, the manufacturer should not
continue to be held responsible for what is simply an accident.72
Although there are truly defective products and unreasonably
dangerous products, there is also some residual level of "unavoida-
ble" accidents that simply cannot be controlled by the manufac-
turer without affecting the utility of the product or discontinuing
its manufacture. 8
For example, in the case of the paradigm, a twenty-three year
history of no products liability claims is at least evidentiary of a
reasonably safe machine. Additionally, the nature of the claims do
not show that the machine is defective. Perhaps these claims were
merely the result of the statistical residual accident rate. Yet be-
cause of them, the small manufacturing firm may be unable to
obtain or afford products liability insurance for a reasonably safe
and socially useful product.
Furthermore, the manufacturer is not always in the best posi-
tion to control safety. Over thirty-seven percent of all products
liability actions, 4 and a much larger percentage of capital goods
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PROD-
UCTS AND SERVICES (1975); Posner, supra note 66; Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel,
supra note 20, at 1119.
72. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 71, at 98-99.
73. Wilson, Products Liability Part II: The Protection of the Producing Enterprise,
43 CAL L. REV. 809, 811 (1955):
A harvester of x degrees safety will not normally injure the user. But since a
certain number of people are known to be "non mechanical," bad with their
hands, butterfingers, perhaps there is a statistical risk of injury to one person per
thousand users quite apart from any contributory negligence considerations.
74. O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Work-
ers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees, with an Employer's Remedy against
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liability actions, are based on workplace accidents where the em-
ployer, not the manufacturer, has the primary responsibility and
control of the environment. 5 The reason for this is that capital
goods, by definition, are those used in the workplace. 76 Thus, vir-
tually all of the actions involving capital goods manufacturers will
be based on workplace accidents.1
Workers' compensation laws which immunize employers and
the limited recoveries permitted by these laws7 8 result in actions
against the manufacturer in strict tort liability for accidents that
it cannot and should not control. 79 As Justice Traynor wrote in
Greenman, "[t]he purpose of such [strict] liability is to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves."' 80 Contrary to Justice Traynor's position, however, the
manufacturer, rather than the injured person, may well be the
party who is powerless to protect itself both from the negligent
and unsafe practices of an employer protected by workers' com-
pensation laws and from a negligent and unsafe employee.,'
Imposing an almost prohibitive risk of bankruptcy or liquidation
on the small manufacturing firm based on liability without fault
cannot provide incentive for a safer product. Rather, it will en-
courage voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy and the attendant
societal loss of productive capacity and employment. Again, what
is needed is affordable and available insurance.
C. Spreading The Risk
The rationale of spreading the risk of injury through insurance
or through the manufacturer's broad customer base works well
when insurance is available and affordable or when the manufac-
turer is large enough to effectively accomplish the risk spread-
ing. 2 But the rationale fails when insurance becomes unavailable
Third Parties, 1976 INs. L.J. 683-85. O'Connell estimates that from 37% to 85% of prod-
ucts liability actions involve "products employed in work related situations".
75. Id. at 685; Epstein, supra note 58, at 19.
76. See supra note 7.
77. O'Connell, supra note 74, at 685.
78. Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 Il. App. 2d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553
(1976). See also Mitchell, Products Liability. Workmen's Compensation and the Indus-
trial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349, 354-56 (1976).
79. Epstein, supra note 58, at 19.
80. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
81. Epstein, supra note 58, at 19.
82. The Task Force found that the larger manufacturers rarely had problems ob-
taining products liability insurance. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at ES-5.
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or unaffordable to the small manufacturer. Furthermore, the
small manufacturer's customer base is not broad enough to spread
this risk to a significant degree:
It is a common failing to overlook the problem of the small
manufacturer. When social reformers speak of "manufacturers"
they generally assume that all manufacturers are in the position
of U.S. Steel Corporation or General Motors or Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey. It may very well be (leaving out con-
siderations of justice) that large organizations of this character
can absorb or distribute an item of increased cost such as that
which would result from the imposition of strict liability. But
many manufacturers are in a totally different situation. Their
position in the industry is vulnerable and their competitive situa-
tion delicate. It is these comparatively small manufacturers who
suffer when additional costs are added without regard to their
situation."3
Thus, strict products liability has the detrimental effect of con-
centrating productive capacity in larger firms because they are
able to obtain products liability insurance or spread the risk of
loss over their broad customer base. Over the long term, as more
small manufacturers drop out, competition is reduced and prices
may rise.
In the paradigm, a firm making $75,000 pretax profit cannot
afford an increase in products liability insurance of $36,000 unless
this rise in costs could be passed along to its customers by higher
prices. There is a further distinct probability that the insurance
could become even more expensive or completely unavailable. 4
The small manufacturer then may go without products liability
insurance and risk bankruptcy or liquidation if an accident
occurs.
85
D. Cost Internalization
The rationale that accident costs of products should be internal-
ized rather than externalized because all products should be made
to "pay their own way" in the market place is persuasive.8 6 Acci-
dent costs are internalized when the product price fully reflects all
of the accident costs; externalization occurs when these costs are
Moreover, because of their size, large manufacturers may be able to self-insure, spreading
the risk of loss over their broad customer base.
83. Plant, supra note 34, at 1121 n.147.
84. Only three second and third rate insurance companies would even bid on the
insurance in 1985.
85. Coccia, supra note 64, at 262. Working Group Report. supra note 31, at 57 n.4.
Doing business without products liability insurance is known as "going bare."
86. G. CALABREsI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS 24-29, 68-75, 144-49 (1970). Owen,
supra note 58, at 713-14.
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spread to other products or customers.8s For example, if products
liability insurance rates were the same for all manufacturers with-
out regard to the safety or loss history of the product, some of the
accident costs of more dangerous products would be borne by the
safer products and thus externalized from the more dangerous
products.
Accident costs should be internalized because, theoretically, this
encourages production of products in relation to their full societal
cost.88 If all products bore their own accident costs by basing in-
surance rates on their own loss history, then the more dangerous
products would become more expensive. That is, the more danger-
ous product would logically be involved in more injuries. In turn,
the cost of insurance would be greater for such products than for
safer products. If internalized, this higher cost would be reflected
in the product being more expensive to consumers. Consumers
then would decide in the market place whether the more danger-
ous products are socially useful enough to justify their higher
prices.8 9
A distinction should be made, however, between defective prod-
uct costs and residual accident costs. Defective product costs are
those costs directly related to the safety and design of the product
considering its utility and purpose; residual accident costs are
those costs associated with an unavoidable statistical risk of injury
despite the product being as safe as reasonably possible.90 Defec-
tive product costs should not be allowed to be externalized be-
cause such externalization causes production of goods that would
not be produced if the consumer had to pay the full cost of the
goods including the defective product costs.9 1
There is a certain level of residual accidents92 that occur in even
reasonably safe products, however, especially capital goods prod-
ucts. The manufacturer has no control over these accidents be-
cause, generally, they are the result of employers' and employees'
conduct. The manufacturer clearly should pay defective product
costs as an incentive to produce a reasonably safe product. But the
residual accident costs of capital goods should properly be paid
either by the employee whose unsafe conduct caused the accident
or the employer whose working conditions were at fault. Yet with
the trend toward "stricter" liability, expanded plaintiffs' recov-
87. G. CALABRESI, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Wilson, supra note 73, at 811. The writer uses "residual accident costs" to de-
scribe the costs associated with Wilson's "statistical risk of injury."
91. G. CALABRESI, supra note 86.
92. Wilson, supra note 73, at 811.
1987]
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
eries and the historical immunity of employers under the workers'
compensation laws, the small capital goods manufacturer is forced
to pay both the residual accident cost and the defective product
cost. A mechanism must be found to spread the residual accident
cost to the employee and to the employer within the present legal
framework. That mechanism is insurance reform.
Additionally, the small capital goods manufacturer, by defini-
tion, produces a long life product. 3 Each year more and more of
his products are in use. This so called "long tail" of exposure
causes additional problems because the statute of limitations in
tort cases typically begins to run when the injury occurs, not when
the product is sold.94 The manufacturer thus can be held liable for
products for ten to twenty years of use.95 When insuring such
manufacturers, the insurance companies must take this "long tail"
of risk into account in computing the products liability insurance
rates and assessing the risk exposure. Assuming that the manufac..
turer's sales are relatively stable, this "long tail" of risk can be ten
or twenty times the yearly production of the small manufacturer.
This means that in computing an insurance rate, the insurance
company must consider this exposure and each machine sold each
year must bear the risk of ten or twenty times its own exposure.
Due to the products' long lives, this problem is especially acute in
industrial machinery manufacturing96 and the aircraft industry.9?
In the paradigm, the yearly average sales of 160 machines must
bear the risk exposure of the entire 4,000 machines that remain in
service. Furthermore, if sales are reduced below the average be-
cause of unfavorable business conditions, each machine must bear
an even greater burden. For example, if the product liability in-
surance premium is $40,000.00 and sales are 160 machines, the
premium is $250.00 per machine. Regardless of the number of
sales, the insurance premium would at least stay at the same level
(or could rise because of inflation, increased injuries or to protect
93. See supra notes 7 & 46 and accompanying text.
94. Some states have enacted statutes of repose limiting the time in which products
liability actions may be brought. These laws are generally disfavored by plaintiffs and face
serious constitutional challenges. For a detailed analysis of state enacted statutes of repose
and constitutional issues, see McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of
Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 579 (1980).
95. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at ES-5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association reports that the cost of liability
insurance per aircraft was $51 for the 6,778 business, commuter and private air-
craft delivered in 1962, and increased to $211 for the 9,774 delivered in 1972.
Currently, for the 2,000 planes delivered in 1985, the liability insurance cost has
increased to $70,000 per plane.
Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 13.
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against the "long tail" of liability). So, assuming that the liability
insurance premium remains constant at $40,000.00 but that sales
decrease to forty machines because of unfavorable business condi-
tions, each machine must now bear $1,000.00 of the insurance
premium.
Thus, merely to break even with no increase in insurance pre-
mium, the paradigm manufacturer must increase the price per
machine by $750.00 just because of the reduced level of sales. The
competitive market conditions simply may not allow such an in-
crease when the manufacturer is hit by both increasing liability
insurance costs and reduction of the number of machines sold.9 8
E. The Insurance Problem
As discussed above,99 the traditional goals and rationales of
strict products liability have serious shortcomings when applied to
the small capital goods manufacturer. However, given the strong
consumer sentiment in the United States today and absent a more
compelling crisis, any major legislative action reducing either the
number of claims or the amount of damages per claim will be
politically difficult.100 Moreover, the judicially developed law of
strict products liability is becoming more and more skewed toward
compensating the injured person without regard to the manufac-
turer's plight.101
Therefore, any solution to the products liability problem niust
provide both for reasonable compensation to the injured person
and for the continued existence of the small capital goods manu-
facturer by making products liability insurance "more widely
available and affordable . *.".., The primary problem of the
small capital goods manufacturer is his inability to spread the cost
of injury when he becomes a poor risk to the insurance com-
pany.10 3 In the paradigm, when the two lawsuits were filed, details
of the lawsuits along with other underwriting information (sales,
number of employees, type of products, etc.) were given to each
prospective insurer before they agreed to furnish a price quotation
98. The general aviation industry figures cited supra note 97 serve as an extreme
example of this problem.
99. See supra notes 57-97 and accompanying text.
100. Hollings, Product Liability Law: Let's Keep the Federal Government out of it,
7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347 (1984).
101. Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, INs. LAW J., Apr.
1977, at 213.
102. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, reprinted at 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716
(1979) [hereinafter UPLA].
103. Based on a personal interview with Bruce Moore, partner at Barney & Barney
Insurance Agency, San Diego, Cal. (Nov. 25, 1985).
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on the desired coverage. Some insurance companies would accept
this "poor risk" only with a substantial increase in the pre-
mium.10' Others declined to accept the risk at all and refused to
quote a price for the coverage. Thus, the paradigm manufacturer
may be unable to spread the risk either because it cannot afford
the increased premium or, in some cases, cannot secure coverage
at all.10 5
Yet, why would a rational insurance company whose very exis-
tence is based on spreading risks over large numbers of insurers
refuse to insure a reasonably insurable risk? The answer lies in
the statutory capital reserve system. To assure the financial stabil-
ity of insurance companies and to further assure that funds will be
available to pay any claims that may arise, insurance statutes pro-
vide that certain capital reserve funds be maintained by insurance
companies. °10 The insurer may not transact business in the state if
these reserve funds fall below a certain specified amount, usually
based on a percentage of total premiums collected.1 07
In practice, the capital reserve requirements force the insurance
companies to reduce the total amount of policies written. Thus,
insurance companies must reduce their insurance in force when
their capital reserves are depleted. Generally, this reserve fund
must be maintained at one-third of the earned premiums of an
insurance company. In other words, the insurance company must
maintain in capital reserves an amount equal to one-third of the
total premiums it receives each year or face sanctions from the
commissioner of insurance.108
For example, an insurance company that receives earned premi-
ums of $100 million in 1986 is required to have $33 million in
capital reserves. If underwriting or investment losses1 9 reduce
these capital reserves by $5 million to $28 million, then in 1987
the company can provide insurance based on only $84 million in
premiums. (One-third of $84 million is $28 million.) Thus, a $5
104. This increase was from $4,000.00 to $40,000.00 per year..
105. See supra notes 84 & 85.
106. See, e.g., CAL INs. CODE § 923.5 (Deering Supp. 1987).
107. See, e.g., id. §§ 11556-11558. CAL INS. CODE § 11558 requires reserves of sixty
percent of earned premiums during each year less the amount already paid for losses and
expenses. In practice, this amounts to approximately one-third of the earned premiums.
Supra note 103.
108. See, e.g., CAL ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R. 2319-2319.4 (1976).
109. Capital reserves may be depleted by underwriting losses (that is, losses due to
errors in estimating the magnitude of risk) or investment losses (that is, losses on invest-
ments or loss of income because of lower interest rates). In the early 1970's, insurance
companies suffered both types of losses, depleting their reserves and reducing their pre-
mium collecting capacity severely. See generally Page & Stephens, The Product Liability
Insurance "Crisis:" Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 387 (1984), and
Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 16-52 for a discussion of the causes of the crisis.
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million reduction in capital reserves forces an immediate $16 mil-
lion reduction in the amount of premiums that can be collected
and a corresponding reduction in the amount of policies that can
be provided.
Furthermore, since the insurance company is losing money, it
must increase the price of the premiums to restore its reserves. If
the insurance company decides to increase premium income by
fifty percent this year to cover these losses, it must charge $84
million for coverage that would have cost $56 million in 1986.
(One hundred fifty percent of $56 million is $84 million.) This
would require not only a substantial increase in the amount of
premium charged to insureds that are able to obtain insurance (an
increase from $56 million to 84 million) but also a severe reduc-
tion in the amount of insurance that can be provided. 110
This capital reserve requirement system means that a relatively
small underwriting or investment loss which reduces capital
reserves can substantially reduce the amount of insurance that the
company is allowed to write. The Task Force, and more recently
the Working Group, alluded to this "capacity" problem as a cause
of unavailability or unaffordability of products liability insur-
ance."1 When facing such a mandatory reduction in premiums,
the companies are very selective in their renewals "and cancel or
fail to renew those [companies] with poor loss records-and obvi-
ously the greatest need." 1 2
Unfortunately, the paradigm manufacturer falls precisely into
this category. Two products liability actions and a "long tail" of
potential liability make it a relatively poor risk to the insurance
company faced with a mandatory cutback of insurance business.
The small capital goods manufacturer may have the greatest need
because its very existence may be threatened if it must "go bare"
and another products liability action is filed with potentially con-
fiscatory damages.11 3
The critical problem of the small capital goods manufacturer,
therefore, is its inability to spread the risk of accident costs be-
cause of the unavailability or unaffordability of products liability
insurance. Moreover, the goals and rationales of strict products
110. Actually, the insurance company will be charging $84 million in 1987 for cover-
age that would have cost $56 million in 1986. These figures were developed from a personal
interview with Bruce Moore, supra note 103, and from Riggs, Insurance Industry Re-
trenching after Heavy Claims, San Diego Union, Oct. 13, 1985, at I-1, col. I (quoting Mr.
Moore, partner at Barney & Barney, insurance agency, San Diego, Cal.).
I l I. Task Force Legal Study, supra note 6, Vol. III, at 132; Working Group Report,
supra note 31, at 16-17 n.l.
112. Riggs, supra note 110.
113. Task Force Selected Papers, supra note 6, at 555-56.
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liability are not being accomplished as applied to the small capital
goods manufacturer in this situation because an injured plaintiff
may not be adequately compensated by an uninsured or underin-
sured manufacturer.
Recognizing the potential problems of strict products liability
and its possible effect on the manufacturing capability of the
United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce sponsored an
exhaustive study of products liability culminating in the Final Re-
port of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability.11 4 This
Task Force Report has been the basis for almost all of the pro-
posed federal and state products liability legislation. A brief anal-
ysis of some of these proposals as they affect the small capital
goods manufacturer follows.
II. PROPOSALS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SMALL CAPITAL
GOODS MANUFACTURER
The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability found three
major causes of the products liability problem:" 5
(1) the insurance industry's rating practices;
(2) manufacturing practices; and
(3) uncertainties in the tort litigation system.The primary admin-
istrative, legislative and academic proposals affecting the small
capital goods manufacturer include:
(1) the Model Uniform Product Liability Act;
(2) federal bills introduced by Senator Kasten 1 6 and Representa-
tive Shumway;117
(3) the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981;118
(4) the proposal that workers' compensation be an injured
worker's sole remedy;119 and
(5) the potential adoption of the New Zealand Accident Compen-
114. See supra notes 6 & 45.
115. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at 1-20-1-29.
116. Senator Robert Kasten, Jr., (R-Wis.) introduced Senate Bill 100 in the first
session of the 99th Congress on January 3, 1985. It was rejected by the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation on May 16, 1985.
117. Representative Norman Shumway (R-Cal.) introduced a similar proposal in the
House of Representatives, Bill 2568, in the first session of the 99th Congress on May 21,
1985. For a detailed history and analysis of prior congressional response to the products
liability problem through 1982, see Coccia, supra note 64, at 243-44.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (1982 & Supp. II 1985). For more detailed informa-
tion, see Maxfield, Risk Retention Act: An Alternative Form of Product Liability Insur-
ance for Small Business, 32 FE'N INS COUNS. Q. 273 (1982); Shea, The Product Liability
Risk Retention Act of 1981, 28 PRAcr. LAW, Mar. 1, 1982, at 9.
119. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Illinois has written extensively
on no-fault insurance systems. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra notes 71 & 74.
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sation Plan.120
With the exception of the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of
1981 which involves insurance industry practices, the proposals
largely address the third cause-the uncertainties in the tort liti-
gation system brought about by the inconsistencies of the various
state common and statutory laws of products liability.
A plaintiff injured by a product can bring suit on at least three
distinct theories of recovery: negligence, breach of warranty and
strict liability in tort under Section 402A of the Restatement.12'
Each of the fifty states applies somewhat different rules of com-
mon law regarding the prima facie case for each theory, the al-
lowable defenses and the relative burdens of proof.122 Addition-
ally, state legislative enactments have been inconsistent and
largely ineffective as a solution for the small capital goods manu-
facturer because they have created "51 sets of differing state laws,
cases and enactments."' 23
The various proposals and statutes were initiated as a reponse
to these disparities, especially in light of the burdens placed on the
small capital goods manufacturer. As a direct result of the Task
Force study, the first attempt at resolving the uncertainties of the
tort litigation system was the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act.
A. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act
To try to unify state law on products liability, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce drafted the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act and recommended its passage to the states. 24 Its goals were
"first, to assure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe prod-
ucts will be adequately compensated for their injuries and, second,
to make product liability insurance more widely available and af-
fordable ....
The UPLA was published in its final form on October 31,
120. In 1972, New Zealand enacted a comprehensive no-fault system of accident
compensation for all accident victims. The plan was briefly discussed in the Task Force
Legal Study but was discarded because of political "realities." See infra 180-89 and ac-
companying text.
121. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 19; Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel,
supra note 20; and Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 20.
122. L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY vol. 2A, ch. 3D and vol. 5,
app. (individual state statutes).
123. Smith, supra note 48, at 36. For a detailed analysis, see L. FRuMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 122.
124. UPLA, supra note 102, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,714.
125. Id. at 62,716.
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197926 and was offered as a model state law.127 It has not been
adopted in full by any state, although over thirty states have
adopted some form of products liability legislation. 128 However,
these statutes are inconsistent, are not comprehensive and have
failed to resolve the uncertainties in the products liability tort liti-
gation system. 2 To illustrate the inconsistencies and uncertain-
ties of the state statutes compared to the UPLA, each of the rele-
vant provisions affecting the small capital goods manufacturer will
be briefly discussed. 30
(1) The UPLA consolidates the three theories of a manufacturer's
liability, that is, negligence, breach of warranty and strict tort lia-
bility, into one products liability claim and specifically preempts
the Uniform Commercial Code. The state laws generally do not
consolidate the three theories, instead retaining negligence and the
UCC provisions.
(2) The UPLA specifically defines defectiveness with respect to
manufacturing defects, design defects, inadequate warnings or in-
structions and breach of warranty. The state laws do not; instead,
they retain the common law concepts of negligence, implied war-
ranty, strict liability in tort based on Restatement section 402A
and the U.C.C. formulation of express and implied warranty.
(3) State laws vary greatly as to when and whether subsequent
remedial measures (that is, changes in the product's design, warn-
ings or instructions, "state of the art" or custom in the industry
after the product was manufactured) are admissible. Under the
UPLA, these measures will not be admitted as evidence of
defectiveness.
(4) Generally, the state laws do not consider meeting administra-
tive regulatory standards as probative of safety and non-defective-
ness of the product. The UPLA makes compliance with these
standards a rebuttable presumption that must be overcome by the
plaintiff.
(5) The UPLA adopts a two year statute of limitations from the
time of injury but allows the manufacturer to prove that the harm
was caused after the product's "useful safe life" to avoid liability.
Many states have adopted "statutes of repose" that absolutely bar
products liability actions after a certain period of time (for exam-
ple, six to twelve years after a product is sold or manufactured).
Some statutes of limitations also vary.
126. Id. at 62,714.
127. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. For a more thorough examination of each of thee elements, see generally L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 122, and UPLA, supra note 102, at 62,720-37.
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(6) The UPLA adopts comparative responsibility and apportion-
ment of damages based on the actions of all parties including the
plaintiff. The state laws range from full comparative responsibility
of all parties (similar to the UPLA) to contributory negligence of
the plaintiff being a complete bar to recovery.
The UPLA, if adopted by all states, would provide needed uni-
formity and reform. But, since it has not been adopted in full by
any state fully six years after its publication, it is virtually certain
that it will not be generally accepted. 131 This improbability of
adoption has prompted attempts at direct federal legislation.
B. Federal Proposals
Federal efforts to pass products liability legislation began with
the 95th Congress in 1977.132 A recent proposal of Senator Robert
Kasten, Jr., Senate Bill 100, was introduced on January 3, 1985,
in the 99th Congress. Although it has been rejected by the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, it is representa-
tive of the general approach of the federal proposals. The provi-
sions of Senator Kasten's bill that most concern the small capital
goods manufacturer are:
(1) It preempts all state law on products liability and consolidates
actions that formerly would have been based on (a) strict liability
in tort; (b) negligence; (c) breach of express or implied warranty;
and (d) failure to warn or instruct.1"3(2) It defines the responsibility of manufacturers with regard to
(a) manufacturing defects; (b) design defects; (c) failure or inade-
quacy of warnings or instructions; and (d) express warranty.'"
Strict liability is essentially retained for manufacturing defects
and breach of express warranty, but negligence and its risk-benefit
analysis13 5 are applied to design and warning defects.31
(3) It applies principles of comparative responsibility which re-
duce, but do not bar completely, a claimant's recovery when some
responsibility for the harm is attributed to the claimant. 137 Evi-
dence of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, product
131. Coccia, supra note 64, at 243; S. REP. No. 476, supra note 126, at 6.
132. See Coccia, supra note 64, at 243-44 nn.1 & 2 for a detailed list of bills intro-
duced in Congress from 1977 through 1980. Since that time, Senator Kasten introduced S.
100, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) and Representative Shumway introduced H.R. 2729,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and H.R. 2568, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
133. S. 100, supra note 132, § 3(b)(4).
134. Id. § 4.
135. That is, the balancing of the challenged design against the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
136. S. 100, supra note 132, § 5. See also supra notes 41-42.
137. S. 100, supra note 132, § 9(a).
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misuse or modification and acts of third parties (for example, an
employer or other employees) will be considered in determining
comparative responsibility.
(4) It provides employees an action against a manufacturer for
workplace injuries, but reduces recoveries by amounts paid under
workers' compensation.138
(5) It requires that a claim be made against any capital goods
manufacturer within twenty-five years of first delivery of the prod-
uct.139 This provision is much more to claimants' interest than
state statutes of repose which are typically six to twelve years. 140
(6) It provides that subsequent remedial measures are generally
not admissable1 41
(7) It includes a two year statute of limitation which begins to run
when the claimant discovers or should have discovered the harm
and its cause.14 2
Since many manufacturers sell in more than one state, they are
unable to determine to which standard they will be held because
of the present patchwork of state and common law and inconsis-
tent jury decisions. Thus, the primary advantage of the federal
proposals and the UPLA, if passed by all states, is the uniformity
and consistency not found in the existing common law. Although a
detailed analysis of these proposals is beyond the scope of this
Comment, 43 with respect to the small capital goods manufac-
turer, neither the proposals nor the state legislative enactments
appear to be the solution to the problem.
The UPLA has been ineffective because it has not been enacted
by the states. The federal proposals which have been introduced
in five sessions of Congress1 45 do not appear close to passage. They
are attempts to balance the conflicting interests of consumers,
manufacturers, sellers, insurance companies and the legal profes-
138. Id. § 10(a).
139. Id. § Il(a)(l).
140. See supra note 94.
141. S. 100, supra note 132, § 13(a).
142. Id. § 14.
143. For detailed analyses of the proposal, see Symposium on Product Liability, 13
CAP U.L. REv. 335 (1984); Coccia, supra note 64; Cohen, Analysis of the Products Liabil-
Ity Act (S.44 98th Congress) as Reported, 3 J. PROD. L. I (Mar./June 1984); Cooke, The
Federal Product Liability Bill: The Judge's View, 15 TRIAL LAW. Q. 5 (Spr. 1983); Davis,
Product Liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 513 (1980); Dworkin,
supra note 25; Murphy, Federal Product Liability Legislation, 38 J. Mo. B. 371 (1982);
The Special Committee on Product Liability, The Model Uniform Product Liability Act,
37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 222 (1982); Specter, The Federal Product Liability Bill: The
Lawyer's View, 15 TRIAL LAW Q. 9 (Spr. 1983); Twerski, The Federal Product Liability
Bill: The Professor's View, 15 TRIAL LAW. Q. 19 (Spr. 1983).
144. Coccia, supra note 64, at 243.
145. Id. at 243-44.
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sion. By and large, these proposals are a move backward on the
caveat emptor-absolute liability continuum and have drawn se-
vere criticism from consumer advocates. 14 6 Furthermore, these
federal proposals are riddled with special interest sections 147 and
consequently would not be tolerated in an age of consumerism and
expanded plaintiffs' recoveries.
C. The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981
The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981148 attempts
to solve the critical problem of unaffordability or unavailability of
products liability insurance which faces the small capital goods
manufacturer. This act allows the establishment of "risk retention
groups" or "captive insurance companies" to assume, spread or
purchase products liability insurance.149 The act exempts these en-
tities from the stringent state regulation of insurance companies 150
although it does provide for strict financial monitoring to assure
sufficient reserves for plaintiffs' judgments.151
The theory of the act is to reduce regulatory barriers to the
formation of these entities, thus allowing small firms to band to-
gether to self insure or reinsure, that is, purchase insurance at
wholesale rates. The theory is plausible, but in practice the small
capital goods manufacturer does not have the assets to retain the
risk of self insurance nor the expertise to form groups to do so or
to reinsure.15 2 The so-called "insurance crisis" of the early
1970'S153 eased shortly after the act was passed and products lia-
bility insurance again became affordable and available.'" This did
not occur because of provisions of the act; rather, the easing of the
crisis was due primarily to investment gains made by insurance
companies in the bull markets of the late 19701s.155 As investment
146. See, e.g., Hollings, supra note 100.
147. See Smith, supra note 48.
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
149. Comment, Solving the Products Liability Insurance Crisis: A Study of the
Role of Economic Theory in the Legislative Reform Process, 31 MERCER L. REV. 755,
767-68 (1980). Risk retention groups are groups of small manufacturers or sellers that
band together to assume, spread or reinsure (purchase at wholesale) products liability in-
surance. A captive insurance company is a company formed by the manufacturer or seller
for the purpose of handling the insurance requirements of the parent manufacturer or seller
only. Premiums are paid to the captive insurance company by the parent manufacturer or
seller and the captive either assumes or reinsures the risk.
150. Id. at 768.
151. Id. at 768-69.
152. Page & Stephens, supra note 109, at 398-99.
153. Id. at 387. See also infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
154. Page & Stephens, supra note 109, at 388, 396-97.
155. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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gains increased capital reserves, insurance capacity (the dollar
amount of policies that can be written) increased, forcing insur-
ance companies to become very competitive to maintain or in-
crease their market share.15 6
Thus, with products liability insurance both available and af-
fordable, manufacturers had little incentive to form risk retention
groups or captive insurance companies. In fact, few risk retention
groups have been formed and "to date it would be safe to assume.
. the Risk Retention Act has had no effect whatsoever on prod-
ucts liability insurance costs.115 7 A scheme whose viability de-
pends on the investment results of the insurance companies can
hardly be a permanent, rational solution to the problem. This act
does not address the real problem in products liability insur-
ance-the reduction in insurance capacity forced by the statutory
reserve requirements when underwriting or investment losses de-
plete insurance company reserves.1 8  As a further indication that
the act had virtually no effect on products liability insurance costs,
yet another insurance "crisis" is approaching.' 59
D. Workers' Compensation As Workers' Sole Remedy
The Task Force recommended that consideration be given to
making workers' compensation the sole remedy for workplace in-
juries and to increasing such benefits to a more equitable level.160
The limited recovery schedules of workers' compensation were de-
veloped historically as quid pro quo for its no-fault principles and
have never included amounts that would be payable for pain and
suffering or impairment of earning capacity.61
Workers' compensation as the sole remedy for workplace inju-
ries would eliminate the injured worker's right to bring a tort
claim against the manufacturer of a product if the worker were
injured while using the product in the course of employment. 62 If
adopted, this recommendation would provide an immediate solu-
tion to the problem of the small capital goods manufacturer. 6 3
156. See discussion of the insurance reserve system, supra notes 106-12.
157. Product Liability Act: Hearings on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
sumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st.
Sess. 139 (1983) (testimony of William Ford, Chairman of the Coalition for a Uniform
Product Liability Law). See also Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 58-59.
158. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 3 and 110 and accompanying text.
160. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at VII-251.
161. Mitchell, supra note 78, at 354.
162. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at VII-103.
163. This proposal, however, would do little for the consumer goods manufacturer
because consumer goods are not generally used in the workplace.
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Well over thirty percent (and perhaps as many as eighty-five per-
cent) of the products liability suits are based on injuries caused by
products in work related situations.1 ' Since capital goods are by
definition products used in the workplace, 6 5 if workers' compensa-
tion were made the sole remedy for these accidents, then products
liability suits against all capital goods manufacturers would be
virtually eliminated.1 66
Much has been written on this proposal and its advantages of
quick and fair compensation to victims as well as its reduction of
transaction costs.1 67 For every dollar paid by insurance companies
in a products liability suit, twenty-six cents is paid to the plain-
tiff's attorneys and an additional thirty-seven cents is paid to the
defendant's lawyers. 6 Therefore, only thirty-seven cents of each
dollar paid by insurers reaches the plaintiff; this could be nearly
doubled to sixty-five to seventy cents under a workers' compensa-
tion system because "the huge amounts now spent on legal fees..
would be saved."1 69 "The only clear beneficiaries of [the present]
system appear to be lawyers. ' 70
The disadvantages of the proposal are (1) limiting recovery ex-
clusively to workers' compensation, (2) reducing manufacturers'
incentive to produce safer products and (3) increasing the cost of
workers' compensation insurance to employers.17 1 To overcome
these disadvantages and implement the proposal, workers' com-
pensation awards must be increased. Under an exclusive no-fault
system, however, the injured worker still would not be allowed
substantial damages for pain and suffering.172 This is the most se-
rious drawback of the exclusive no-fault system as injured workers
could not maintain actions against manufacturers which are pres-
164. O'Connell, supra note 74, at 685 (citing Insurance Company of North America,
Products Liability: Some Professional Considerations, Booklet H H-8306, 3 (1976) (avail-
able from INA Corp., Philadelphia, PA.)).
165. See supra note 7.
166. O'Connell, supra note 74, at 684.
167. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra notes 71 and 74.
168. A study by The Rand Corporation involving 24,000 claims, reprinted in
Schwartz & Bares, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solution That Will
Work, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 351, 354 n.10 (1984), revealed that "for every dollar received by
plaintiff in a product liability suit, 41 cents is paid immediately to the plaintiff's attorney.
The defendant spends an additional 58 cents in legal costs." Thus, of a total cost to the
insurance company of $1.58, 59 cents goes to the plaintiff, 41 cents goes to plaintiff's attor-
neys and 58 cents to the defendant's attorneys. Converting these figures, for every dollar
paid by insurance companies in a products liability suit, 37 cents is paid to the plaintiff, 26
cents to the plaintiff's attorney and 37 cents to the defense lawyers. See also Working
Group Report. supra note 31, at 42-45.
169. O'Connell, supra note 71, at 98 (footnote omitted).
170. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 45.
171. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at 4-76.
172. Task Force Industry Study, supra note 6, at VII-104.
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ently allowed by tort law.
To retain the manufacturer's incentive to produce safe products,
the manufacturer could be required to pay into the workers' com-
pensation system based on the number and types of machines
sold.173 Another possibility is that employers could be allowed an
arbitration or contribution procedure against manufacturers based
on comparative responsibility for the injury. 74 The disadvantage
of this latter mechanism is the added transaction costs that would
be required because an allocation of fault must be made in every
product-related injury case.176 "Presumably, these transaction
costs would be less than those that arise under the present tort-
litigation system [because] the arbitration system would be less
expensive than a jury trial, and there would be no plaintiff's attor-
ney contingent fee involved."17
Since the employer would have some incentive to reduce its
workers' compensation claims, it would tend to purchase safer
products. The manufacturer in response to this market incentive
would thus be encouraged to produce safe products.1 7 But this
may not be as effective as direct liability for injury because there
is more incentive to produce safer products when a manufacturer
is faced with a potentially devastating personal injury suit. Fi-
nally, the increased cost of workers' compensation insurance to
employers could be offset with equitable contributions from manu-
facturers as discussed above and a significant reduction in transac-
tion costs when compared to the present tort litigation system.117
E. The New Zealand Accident Compensation Plan
If spreading the loss is a viable rationale for compensating the
plaintiff, then should it not be carried to its logical conclusion by
truly spreading the loss to all possible accident victims in a social
insurance scheme along the lines of the New Zealand Accident
Compensation Plan? 117 Why should compensation be limited to
those who are "lucky" enough to be injured by a defective prod-
uct? "[V]ictims of crime, illness, [and] earthquakes ... should be
entitled to the same level of protection because they have precisely
the same needs."180
173. Id. at VII-II0.
174. Id. at VI-Ill.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
179. New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972, 2 N.Z. Stat. §§ 1-184 (1975).
180. Epstein, supra note 58, at 20.
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In 1974, New Zealand abandoned both workers' compensation
and the tort litigation system and instituted a comprehensive, gov-
ernment operated no-fault system of accident compensation of all
accident victims. 8' An injured person is paid all medical and re-
habilitation expenses, eighty percent of lost earnings for the dura-
tion of the disability and limited lump sum payments for loss of
body parts or functions and pain and suffering.182 The plan is fi-
nanced by an employers' tax, a motorists' tax and general tax
revenues.18 3
Proponents feel the plan has been an outstanding success. For
example, New Zealand employers only pay 1.07% of their total
payrolls into the system, while in New South Wales, Australia,
the average rate is three times this.8 Furthermore, the drivers'
rate is $14.20 per year per licensed driver compared to the com-
pulsory third party coverage paid by New South Wales automo-
bile owners of $124.00 per year.'85 "The burdens of the New Zea-
land scheme are the lowest of their kind anywhere in the
developed world. And they provide better benefits as well as wider
coverage."'' 86 The plan has been criticized because no tort action
is available to an injured person, illness or disease is not covered,
payment limits are arbitrarily set, manufacturers have no incen-
tive to build safer products and interests of the individual are sac-
rificed to the perceived good of society.18 7 Implementation of such
a plan in the United States is not feasible at present. 88 First, at
the time New Zealand implemented the plan, it had in place a
national health plan that paid full hospital and drug costs and a
significant portion of office visits to physicians. 89 Second, New
181. The New Zealand Accident Compensation Act was adopted in 1972 and
amended in 1973 before it became effective in April 1974. 2 N.Z. Stat. 1413 (1975); Dahl,
Injury Compensation for Everyone?-The New Zealand Experience, 53 J. URB. L. 925,
929 (1976). For a detailed explanation and historical review, see Franklin, Personal Injury
Accidents in New Zealand and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN L.
REV. 653 (1975); Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U.
CHI. REV. 781 (1981); Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two
Years, 25 Am. J. ComP. L. 1 (1977); Sanford, Challenges Past, Present Future, NEw ZEA-
LAND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION REPORT (July 1978). The act was adopted in
New Zealand in 1974 following the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Inquiry
which examined compensation for personal injury. Dahl, supra, at 927-28.
182. 2 N.Z. Stat. §§ 107-38 (1975); Henderson, supra note 181, at 783; Dahl, supra
note 181, at 936-37.
183. 2 N.Z. Stat. §§ 30-42 (1975). Franklin, supra note 181, at 635.
184. Palmer, What Happened To The Woodhouse Report?, NEw ZEALAND LJ. 561,
562 (1981).
185. Id. at 563.
186. Id.
187. Henderson, supra note 181, at 794, 797.
188. Task Force Legal Study, supra note 6, at VI-III.
189. Franklin, supra note 181, at 656-57.
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Zealand is a small agricultural nation compared to the diverse in-
dustrialized society of the United States. Finally, the political "re-
alities" of the powerful insurance industry, consumer groups, legal
profession and medical profession as well as the general American
disinclination toward "socialism" preclude the adoption of such a
plan in the United States today.1 90
Despite an abundance of study, little substantive action has
been taken to address the products liability problem faced by the
small capital goods manufacturer. No state has adopted the
UPLA; no federal products liability act has been passed except for
the Risk Retention Act of 1981 which has been ineffective. The
academic no-fault proposals, the modification of the workers' com-
pensation program and the New Zealand Plan have attracted al-
most no support because of political and economic realities.
III. REFORM AND EQUITABLE RISK SPREADING
To date, no reform has been adopted to aid the small captial
goods manufacturer. This is not to say, however, that such
changes are not attainable while at the same time satisfying the
purposes of products liability.
A. Normative Goals of Products Liability
Products liability legislation should accomplish the following:
(1) Persons injured by an unreasonably dangerous product should
receive reasonable compensation for their injuries including both
economic loss and pain and suffering.191
(2) There should remain a strong incentive for manufacturers to
produce safe products. 92
(3) The cost of accidents should be spread over a large enough
base so as not to impose too great a burden on any particular
group.'
9 3
(4) The true cost of defective products accidents, not including
residual or unavoidable accidents, should be borne by the products
themselves. 9
To accomplish these goals, at least as they relate to the small
capital goods manufacturer, little needs to be done to the present
system. Despite the hue and cry about "reform" of the tort litiga-
190. Task Force Legal Study, supra note 6, at VI-III.
191. UPLA, supra note 101, at 62,714-15.
192. Id. at 62,715.
193. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
194. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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tion system, the legislative proposals are merely a uniform codifi-
cation of the most reasonable provisions of present common and
statutory law. They do not severely limit plaintiffs' recovery, nor
do they eliminate manufacturers' liability.
The Report of the Tort Policy Working Group1 95 recently rec-
ommended certain tort law reforms "that would bring a greater
degree of rationality and predictability to tort law, and thereby
significantly assist in resolving the [insurance] availability/af-
fordability crisis." '196 Although the Working Group Report is
somewhat biased toward the insurance industry's view of the prob-
lem, it does contain some reasonable recommendations for tort
law reform. 197 These recommendations include:
(1) Retaining fault as a basis for liability including a reasonable
application of strict liability for defective products. 198
(2) Requiring that a plaintiff prove by credible scientific and med-
ical evidence that an injury was caused by a defect in the
product.199
(3) Eliminating joint and several liability and its "deep pocket"
results.200
(4) Limiting non-economic damages, including punitive damages,
to $100,000.00.01
(5) Allowing periodic payments of future economic damages.20 2
(6) Reducing awards by amounts received from collateral sources
for the same injury.203
(7) Limiting contingency fees to lawyers per a schedule based on
amount of recovery.20 4
(8) Developing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to re-
duce transaction costs. 20 5
195. Working Group Report, supra note 31. In October, 1985, the U.S. Attorney
General established an Inter-agency Tort Policy Working Group consisting of ten agencies
and the White House. Its report outlined the magnitude of the crisis on insurance availabil-
ity and affordability and included recommendations for tort reform.
196. Id. at 60.
197. Id. at 60-75.
198. Id. at 61-62.
199. Id. at 62-64.
200. Id. at 64-65. An initiative measure (Proposition 51) approved by the people of
California on June 3, 1986, addressed this issue. CAL CIv. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West
Supp. 1987). This law provides that liability shall be several and not joint for non-economic
damages. Id. § 1431.2. This measure is an effort to reduce the "deep pocket" abuses of
joint and several liability that hold a solvent tortfeasor "with only a small or even de
minimis percentage of fault liable for 100% of plaintiff's damage." Working Group Report,
supra note 31, at 64.
201. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 66-69.
202. Id. at 67-70.
203. Id. at 70-72.
204. Id. at 72-74.
205. Id. at 74-75.
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Although these proposals could serve to reduce the abuses of
the tort litigation system,2 e0 they are far from being implemented.
Again, the political and economic realities must be considered.
Even if implemented, these proposals would not solve the prob-
lem confronting the small capital goods manufacturer. The prob-
lem is not so much the tort litigation system as it is the insurance
system.20 7 Even under the new reform proposals or legislation,
products liability insurance may become unavailable or unafford-
able to the small capital goods manufacturer because of the insur-
ance reserve system and the manufacturer's relatively high risk
exposure. Such a manufacturer would still be faced with the same
catastrophic prospect of bankruptcy or liquidation when assessed a
judgment. A judgment being slightly more difficult to win is little
consolation.
B. Insurance Capacity Problem
The insurance industry touts the new reform proposals as a
panacea for what ails the system,2 08 but there is evidence that the
cyclical insurance "crises" have more to do with interest rates,
investment income or reserve requirements than they do with sub-
stantive tort law.209 The substantive tort law of products liability
which has been evolving since the early 1960's21o has seen no ma-
jor change during the last few years to account for this so-called
insurance "crisis." There have been, of course, increases in both
the number of products liability suits filed and the size of the
judgments awarded, but these neither justify nor cause an insur-
ance "crisis" because the function of insurance companies is to
equitably spread the risk of loss over their large customer bases,
whatever that loss may be.21 Indeed, the Tort Policy Working
206. See id. at 29-52 for a description of many of the problems and abuses in the
present tort law system.
207. For a description of the problems facing the insurance industry, see supra notes
106-12 and accompanying text.
208. Based on a personal interview with Bruce Moore, partner at Barney & Barney
Insurance Agency, San Diego, Cal. (Nov. 25, 1985).
209. Page & Stephens, supra note 109, at 401 (quoting a conversation that those
authors had on July 19, 1983, with James H. Mack of the National Machine Tool Builders
Association).
210. For a brief history of the evolution of products liability law, see Wade, supra
note 20.
211. The Tort Policy Working Group found that both the number of products liabil-
ity suits filed and the amount of damages awarded have increased dramatically. Working
Group Report, supra note 31, at 35-52. "For example, the number of product liability
cases filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a
758% increase . . . ." Id. at 45. Average products liability jury verdicts increased from
$393,580 in 1975 to $1,850,452 in 1985, a 370% increase. Id. at 36.
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Group stated that
the crisis in insurance availability and affordability does not ap-
pear to be a crisis for the insurance industry .... Rather, it is a
crisis for the insureds who cannot obtain or afford the insurance
they believe necessary for their on-going activities. And, to the
extent that entities are forced to operate without insurance or
with inadequate insurance, it is a crisis for victims of tortious
conduct who may find that liable defendants cannot pay them
their damages.212
During the last insurance "crisis" in the early 1970's, products
liability rates increased drastically and insurance companies can-
celled policies of higher risk insureds.2"' This "crisis" was largely
responsible for the formation of the Task Force as manufacturers
complained of high rates and unavailability of insurance and in-
surance companies blamed the tort litigation system. 14 By the
late 1970's, with no change in the substantive tort law or the in-
creasing trends in products liability lawsuits, the crisis eased, in-
surance reserves were plentiful, insurance companies scrambled
for business and products liability rates declined.215 Now the
reserves are down again,21 6 insurance capacity is reduced, insur-
ance rates have increased and cancellations of policies of higher
risk companies logically follow. The problem is more the instabil-
ity of the insurance companies' insurance writing capacity than it
is the inconsistency in the tort law.
Furthermore, there is no logical reason for insurance companies
to lose money over the long term. They exist merely to spread the
risk. Their function is to collect enough premiums to pay all the
claims plus a little more to cover expenses and profits. However,
when they miscalculate and suffer losses to their capital reserves,
it causes a disproportionate reduction in insurance writing capac-
ity and a so-called insurance "crisis.1 217 What is needed is stabil-
ity in the amount of insurance that can be written and equitable
spreading of the risk. The Task Force devoted an entire section of
212. Id. at 15.
213. See supra note 109. This was brought about primarily by large investment
losses to insurance companies' portfolios and the resulting contraction of premium collect-
ing capacity. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Day, supra note 3.
215. This was caused by large investment gains during the bull markets and inflation
of the late 1970's which increased reserves and insurance capacity industry-wide and
forced severe competition to maintain market share. See supra note 109.
216. This has been caused by (1) loss of income from insurance companies' portfolios
because of the lowering interest rates and (2) underwriting losses because of the unrealisti-
cally low prices quoted during the last "boom" cycle (1980-82) in an effort to maintain or
increase market share. Page & Stephens, supra note 109, at 390-95. See also supra notes
106-12 and accompanying text for an explanation of how premium writing capacity is af-
fected by reductions in capital reserves.
217, See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
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its report entitled "The Availability of Insurance to All Reasona-
bly Insurable Product Manufacturers and Suppliers at a Cost
Reasonably Commensurate with Product Risk" to explain pre-
cisely this situation. The Task Force noted that "[t]he basic issues
here are whether premiums actually reflect costs related to the
product risk and whether premiums charged different policyhold-
ers are equitable."21 8
C. Equitable Spreading of the Risk Insurance Plan
There were a number of proposals made to the Task Force to
affect availability and affordability of insurance. These
included: 219
(1) assigned risk plans;
(2) government operated funds; and
(3) pooling mechanisms (joint underwriting and reinsurance).
The Task Force Insurance Contractor felt that justifying any of
these government programs would require hard evidence that (1)
a substantial number of businesses were threatened with extinc-
tion; (2) these businesses produce products needed in the econ-
omy; (3) these businesses follow safe manufacturing practices; and
(4) no government action would result in substantial unemploy-
ment, less new product development, transfer of these products
overseas, reduction of competition or substantial inflation.220 Al-
though the Contractor felt that such evidence was lacking, one of
the limitations of the Insurance Study was its reliance on the in-
surance industry and its industry "perspectives."2 21
With very little modification, the present private insurance
mechanism together with the present tort litigation system could
accomplish the goals that strict liability was meant to achieve and
at the same time solve small capital goods manufacturers'
problems. As discussed above, the existing problem results from a
substantial reduction in insurance writing capacity when reserves
are depleted due to underwriting and/or investment losses.22
When both types of losses occur simultaneously, as in the early
1970'S,223 a severe "crunch" occurs. Faced with substantially less
capacity to write insurance policies, the rational insurance com-
218. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at V-2.
219. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at 4-8.
220. Id. at 4-9. The contractor who performed the Insurance Study for the Task
Force was McKinsey, Inc.
221. Task Force Final Report, supra note 6, at 1-15.
222. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 109.
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pany will reduce its exposure to higher risk accounts. 2 4 One cate-
gory of higher risk accounts is the small capital goods manufac-
turer, especially those with a recent loss history.
Based on an underwriting file analysis, the Task Force found
that although products liability rates varied from .06% of sales for
household TV manufacturers to 3.12% of sales for metal working
machinery and equipment manufacturers, rates were less than one
percent of sales in all but a few manufacturing industries. 225 The
question is whether the burgeoning tort liability system will im-
pose too great a burden on the small capital goods manufacturer.
The Tort Policy Working Group felt that at the present time,
"[t]he private sector is being asked to carry a compensation bur-
den which in some instances it simply cannot afford to carry with-
out substantial economic dislocations. Thus, even where insurance
is available, in order to carry this compensation burden, it often is
priced at unacceptable levels. ' 226 But at less than one percent of
overall sales, products liability insurance rates are acceptable and
the solution lies in equitably spreading the risk without unduly
burdening the small capital goods manufacturer because of short-
term problems--either reserve reductions and loss of capacity in
the insurance industry or recent loss history.
The private insurance industry is uniquely qualified to equitably
spread this risk with relatively minor modifications to the present
system. First, insurance companies must be allowed to continue
writing approximately the same amount of insurance each year,
with proper allowance for growth, but without the tremendous
swings caused by the present reserve requirement system. The
purpose of the reserve system is to assure that insurance compa-
nies are financially secure and that funds will be available for
claims payment. But, requiring the insurance writing capacity to
expand or contract drastically when capital reserves are depleted
by underwriting or investment losses is unreasonable and to a
large extent transforms an inconvenience into a crisis.
Under the present system, insurance companies are virtually
forced to (1) eliminate their relatively higher risk accounts or (2)
drastically increase premiums or (3) do both. These are precisely
the problems faced by the small capital goods manufacturer. State
regulators must develop a more flexible approach, balancing the
capacity requirements of the industry with the financial security
concerns.
Additionally, some state regulatory mechanism should be devel-
224. Riggs, supra note 110, at 1-1, col. 1.
225. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at 2-25-2-27.
226. Working Group Report, supra note 31, at 52.
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oped to require insurance companies to continue insuring manu-
facturers that desire coverage with premium increases limited to
some maximum percentage of sales.227 If, after some period of
time, the loss history continued to be poor, then the premium
could be raised. 28 Such a plan would serve a dual purpose. First,
it would force the product to carry a larger share of the accident
costs in the marketplace and thus reduce externalization. 229 This
is equitable because if the poor loss history continues, the product
should be required to carry a larger part of the accident costs cor-
responding to the defective product costs. Second, the mechanism
would provide incentive for the manufacturer to improve the
safety of its products because liability insurance rates could climb
to ten percent of sales in five years.
There is a problem with this approach, however: What should
be done about products that are or turn out to be extremely dan-
gerous? Insurance companies must be allowed some way to de-
cline coverage for products that cause almost certain liability far
in excess of premiums that can be charged because of these pro-
posed limitations.23aPerhaps the answers to this relatively small
problem 231 lie in some of the mechanisms suggested to the Task
Force-assigned risk plans, government operated funds or pooling
mechanisms (joint underwriting and reinsurance).232 Serious pub-
lic policy concerns prompted a solution to the similar, but more
difficult, problem of toxic waste contamination. Congress estab-
lished a "superfund" financed by "general [tax] revenues and [ex-
cise] taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals. 23 3 If, as in the
case of toxic waste contamination, the situation requires compen-
227. Since present products liability rates average less than one percent of sales, this
maximum might reasonably be put at five percent of sales for the first five years. A longer
term approach must be taken; perhaps a five year moratorium on increases would be
appropriate.
228. This increase might be ten percent of sales for the next five years.
229. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits of
internalizing costs of products.
230. As an extreme example, the 1985 Jalisco Cheese fiasco in California (where a
number of people died after eating the product) would have resulted in tremendous liability
for any insurance company insuring Jalisco. Almost confiscatory regulation of the insur-
ance industry would have resulted if an insurance company were required to continue in-
suring Jalisco at a maximum rate of five pecent of sales (now zero because of the
problems) for five years, with an increase to ten percent of sales for the next five years.
231. The problem is relatively small only because there are not that many instances
of the extremely dangerous product. To the manufacturer involved or the injured plaintiff,
however, it is an overwhelmingly large problem.
232. Task Force Insurance Study, supra note 6, at 4-8.
233. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also Note, Superfund and
California's Implementation Potential Conflict, 19 CAL W.L. REv. 373 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
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sation of the victims as an overriding public policy, then funds
could be made available from general tax revenues and industry
excise taxes.234
The equitable spreading of the risk approach to products liabil-
ity insurance would accomplish the desired goals of the system:
(1) The approach would provide adequate compensation for in-
jured plaintiffs.
(2) With the prospect of products liability rates increasing over a
period of time to ten percent of sales, manufacturers would have
strong incentive to produce safe products.
(3) Any additional costs of accidents would be spread over the
insurance companies' broad base of customers, but rates to these
customers still would be maintained at a reasonable level, pres-
ently less than one percent of annual sales.
(4) An approximation of the true cost of defective products would
fall on product manufacturers while an approximation of the
residual unavoidable accidents would fall on the large customer
base of the insurer.
CONCLUSION
The trend in strict products liability has been toward eliminat-
ing traditional defenses and imposing increasing liability on manu-
facturers. In an effort to compensate injured plaintiffs, to shift the
accident costs to manufacturers, to spread the risk of accident
costs and to internalize the risk of defective products, strict prod-
ucts liability has caused serious problems for small capital goods
manufacturers.235
At the same time, the insurance reserve system forces a severe
reduction in the amount of insurance that can be written when
insurance companies' capital reserves are depleted due to under-
writing and/or investment losses. An insurance company is thus
faced with a severe mandatory reduction in the amount of insur-
ance that it can underwrite. 36
When a products liability action is filed against a small capital
goods manufacturer, the manufacturer becomes a relatively poor
risk to an insurance company regardless of the actual merits of
the action. A rational insurance company faced with mandatory
cutbacks either declines to insure the manufacturer or drastically
increases the premiums charged. Both alternatives are unaccept-
able to the manufacturer as either may force operation without
234. Note, supra note 233, at 375-82.
235. See supra notes 45-97 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
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products liability insurance. s7
Specifically, when unavailability or unaffordability of products
liability insurance causes a small manufacturer to operate without
insurance, there is a strong possibility of bankruptcy or liquidation
if an accident occurs and a judgment is awarded. Moreover, the
injured plaintiff then is forced to rely on the perhaps inadequate
assets of the firm for compensation.13 8
There are three major causes of the products liability prob-
lem-insurance rating practices, manufacturing practices and un-
certainties in the tort litigation system. 3 Administrative, legisla-
tive and academic proposals have largely addressed the latter
cause-the inconsistencies and inequities of the various state com-
mon and statutory laws of products liability. The state and federal
proposals, however, do not solve the problem of unavailability oir
unaffordability of products liability insurance to the small manu-
facturer. These plans do not and should not severely limit plain-
tiffs' recoveries nor eliminate manufacturers' liability.240
Overall, manufacturing products liability insurance rates aver-
age less than one percent of sales. At this rate, there is little evi-
dence of a major problem in the tort litigation system. What is
needed is some common sense legislation to equitably spread the
risk partially to the small manufacturers and partially to the
broader customer base of the insurance industry.211
First, reform is required in the insurance reserve system to al-
low insurance companies to maintain a relatively stable capacity
to insure without the tremendous swings caused by the present
system.24 2 Second, some mechanism should be developed to re-
quire insurance companies to continue insuring reasonably insura-
ble manufacturers with premium increases limited to some maxi-
mum percent of sales for a certain period of time.243 Finally,
insurance companies must be allowed to decline coverage for
products that cause almost certain liability far in excess of premi-
ums that can be charged due to these limitations.
If, as some commentators predict, the tort liability system is
faulty and costs become too burdensome, then perhaps the time
will come when a social insurance plan will be necessary.
[But] [u]ntil Americans have a comprehensive scheme of social
insurance, courts must resolve by a balancing process the head-
237. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
238. Id.
239. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 116-78 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
242. See Id. for an explanation of some possible reforms.
243. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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on collision between the need for adequate recovery and viable
enterprises .... This balancing task should be approached with
a realizatiou that the basic consideration involves a determina-
tion of the most just allocation of the risk of loss .... 244
The solution proposed here will accomplish the major goals of
strict products liability while preserving the present tort litigation
system, private insurance mechanisms and the small capital goods
manufacturer.
William G. Rood
244. Helene Curtis Indus. Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d. 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967) cert.
denied 391 U.S. 913 (1968) (citing Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 809
(1955)) (emphasis added).
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